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CONTENTSAbstract
The paper analyses the e⁄ect of equity price shocks on current account po-
sitions for the G7 industrialized countries in 1974-2007. It uses a Bayesian
VAR with sign restrictions for the identi￿cation of asset price shocks and to
test empirically for their e⁄ect on current accounts. Such shocks are found to
exert a sizeable e⁄ect, with a 10 percent equity price increase for instance in
the United States relative to the rest of the world worsening the US trade bal-
ance by 0.9 percentage points after 16 quarters. However, the response of the
trade balance to equity price shocks varies substantially across countries. The
evidence suggests that the channels accounting for this heterogeneity function
both through wealth e⁄ects on private consumption and to some extent through
the real exchange rate of countries.
JEL Classi￿cation: E2; F32; F40; G1.
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February 2009Non-technical summary
Current account positions have hardly ever been so dispersed globally as they
are today. It is not only that the largest economy, the United States, has been
recording large current account de￿cits for more than a decade, but other industri-
alized countries, such as the UK and Australia, and some emerging and transition
economies have even larger de￿cits. By contrast, countries such as China, Japan and
oil exporters register corresponding large trade surpluses. At the same time, asset
prices have gone through a marked cycle over the past decade, with equity markets
rising substantially in the second half of the 1990s and in 2002-06 and declining
in 2001-02. The ￿nancial market crisis of 2007-08 has made the importance of as-
set prices for the global economy more than apparent. Despite the ￿nancial crisis,
the role of asset prices for the global economy will most likely increase further as
￿nancial markets deepen and emerging economies liberalize and integrate.
The paper analyses the impact of asset price shocks on the current account. The
objective is not only to grasp the magnitude of the e⁄ect of asset prices on trade, but
also to understand the channels through which this e⁄ect materializes. Asset price
shocks a⁄ect net exports through a wealth channel as households adjust saving and
consumption decisions, and through an exchange rate and terms of trade channel,
altering the relative prices of domestic and foreign goods. Equally importantly, asset
prices may exert di⁄erent e⁄ects across economies, as those with deeper yet more
closed ￿nancial markets may respond more strongly.
The focus of the paper is on the G7 industrialized economies and on the role of
asset price shocks during the period 1974-2007. We use the sign restrictions derived
in Fratzscher and Straub (2008), who build an open-economy DSGE model, in which
changes to asset prices in￿ uence private consumption through wealth e⁄ects. We
then employ a Bayesian VAR, following Canova and De Nicol￿ (2002), Uhlig (2005)
and Peersman (2003), using sign restrictions to test for the e⁄ect of asset price
shocks in the data. This methodology not only requires imposing a relatively small
and intuitive number of identi￿cation restrictions, but importantly it also allows us
to distinguish asset price shocks from other types of shocks, such as to technology,
monetary policy and government spending.
Our empirical ￿ndings show that asset prices exert a sizeable e⁄ect on the trade
balance of countries. The channels through which asset prices in￿ uence net exports
are both through wealth e⁄ects on private consumption and to some extent through
the exchange rate. An increase in asset prices tends to have a positive impact
on short-term interest rates and in￿ ation, and leads to an appreciation of the real
e⁄ective exchange rate and a sizeable increase in consumption. Moreover, we ￿nd
a large degree of cross-country heterogeneity in the impulse response pattern. The
US trade balance is among the most sensitive as net exports, on average, decline
by 0.91 percentage points after 16 quarters in response to a 10 percent increase in
US equity prices relative to the rest of the world. The trade balances of most other
countries react substantially less.
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Current account positions have hardly ever been so dispersed globally as they are
today. It is not only that the largest economy, the United States, has been recording
a current account de￿cit in excess of 5 percent for several years, but other indus-
trialized countries, such as the UK and Australia, and some emerging markets and
transition economies have similar or even larger de￿cits. By contrast, countries such
as China, Japan and oil exporters register corresponding large trade surpluses. At
the same time, asset prices have gone through a marked cycle over the past decade,
with equity markets rising substantially in the second half of the 1990s and in 2002-
06 and declining in 2001-02. The ￿nancial market crisis of 2007-08 has made the
importance of asset prices for the global economy more than apparent. Despite
the ￿nancial crisis, the role of asset prices for the global economy will most likely
increase further as ￿nancial markets deepen and emerging economies liberalize and
integrate.
The paper analyses the impact of asset price shocks on the current account. The
objective is not only to grasp the magnitude of the e⁄ect of asset prices on trade, but
also to understand the channels through which this e⁄ect materializes. Asset price
shocks a⁄ect net exports through a wealth channel as households adjust saving and
consumption decisions, and through an exchange rate and terms of trade channel,
altering the relative prices of domestic and foreign goods. Equally importantly, asset
prices may exert di⁄erent e⁄ects across economies, as those with deeper yet more
closed ￿nancial markets may respond more strongly.
The focus of the paper is on the G7 industrialized economies and on the role of
asset price shocks during the period 1974-2007. We use the sign restrictions derived
in Fratzscher and Straub (2008), who build an open-economy DSGE model, in which
changes to asset prices in￿ uence private consumption through wealth e⁄ects. The
e⁄ect of stock market wealth on consumption arises from the ￿nite lifetime horizon
of households in the model. We then employ a Bayesian VAR, following Canova and
De Nicol￿ (2002), Uhlig (2005) and Peersman (2003), using sign restrictions to test
for the e⁄ect of asset price shocks in the data. This methodology not only requires
imposing a relatively small and intuitive number of identi￿cation restrictions, but
importantly it also allows us to distinguish asset price shocks from other types of
shocks, such as to technology, monetary policy and government spending. Our
empirical implementation follows closely that of Fratzscher and Straub (2008), as
well as that of Fratzscher, Juvenal and Sarno (2007), who test for the e⁄ect of
equity market shocks, housing price shocks and exchange rate shocks on the trade
balance of the United States. The latter paper shows that equity market shocks and
housing price shocks have been important drivers explaining more than 30 percent
of the variation of the US trade balance, whereas exchange rates account for a much
smaller share.
Our empirical ￿ndings show that asset prices exert a sizeable e⁄ect on the trade
6
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are both through wealth e⁄ects on private consumption and to some extent through
the exchange rate. An increase in asset prices tends to have a positive impact
on short-term interest rates and in￿ ation, and leads to an appreciation of the real
e⁄ective exchange rate and a sizeable increase in consumption. Moreover, we ￿nd
a large degree of cross-country heterogeneity in the impulse response pattern. The
US trade balance is among the most sensitive as net exports, on average, decline
by 0.91 percentage points after 16 quarters in response to a 10 percent increase in
US equity prices relative to the rest of the world. The trade balances of most other
countries react substantially less.
The paper is related to three ￿elds of the literature. A ￿rst strand focuses
on the drivers of the large and persistent global current account imbalances. Sev-
eral papers emphasize the importance of a "saving glut" (Bernanke 2005) in many
emerging markets and commodity-exporting countries, partly stemming from the
underdevelopment and lack of integration of ￿nancial markets in those economies
(Caballero et al. 2006, Ju and Wei 2006), as well as the increasing role of ensuing
valuation e⁄ects on gross international asset positions (Gourinchas and Rey 2007,
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2005) and a pre-cautionary motive as a rationale for high
saving rates (e.g. Gruber and Kamin 2007, Chinn and Ito, 2007). Other studies
to explain the dispersion in current account positions stress the role of productivity
di⁄erentials (e.g. Corsetti et al. 2006, Bussiere et al., 2005), or link it to the "great
moderation" which has induced a decline in income volatility and uncertainty (Fogli
and Perri, 2006).
As to the second area, a vast literature identi￿es and measures the e⁄ect of price
changes in various ￿nancial assets on private consumption (e.g. Betraut 2002, Case
et al. 2005). Most of this literature ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect of both equity wealth
and housing wealth on private consumption. However, there is still substantial con-
troversy as to the magnitude and precise functioning of this channel as for instance
exempli￿ed by the con￿ icting results found by Palumbo, Rudd, and Whelan (2006)
and Lettau and Ludvigson (2004). The e⁄ect of such a wealth channel on the ex-
ternal dimension of countries, in particular the current account and the exchange
rate, has so far received little attention in the literature. From a current policy
perspective, is has been argued by some that the US dollar decline would have to
be very large as suggested by several studies (Blanchard et al. 2005, Obstfeld and
Rogo⁄ 2005, Krugman 2007).
The third area relates to the crucial issue of the structural interpretation of
asset price shocks. Although we can separate an asset price shock from the stan-
dard macroeconomic shocks usually analyzed (technology, monetary policy and ￿scal
policy), it is not clear what asset price changes represent structurally. One interpre-
tation of an asset price shock is that of a "news" shock, along the line of work by
Beaudry and Portier (2006, 2007), in which asset prices adjust because of altered
expectations about the likelihood of future outcomes, such as to economic funda-
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asset prices as these represent the net discounted value of all future fundamentals.
This is also related to the work by Engel and Rogers (2006), who show that the
large size of the US current account de￿cit is consistent with expectations of an
increasing share of US output in the world. Moreover, the asset price shock we
identify here can be thought of being related to the shock to monetary policy expec-
tations analysed in Matsumoto et al. (2008), who show how shocks to expectations
to monetary policy and to technology may alter the size and even the sign of the
correlation between equity returns and exchange rate returns.
An alternative interpretation is that asset price shocks re￿ ect rational bubbles,
as in Kraay and Ventura (2005) and Ventura (2001). They argue that the sharp
increase in asset prices over the past decade may largely re￿ ect a bubble, which is
rational because of market expectations that this increase may be persistent. Both
interpretations are observationally equivalent to what we understand and see in the
behavior of economic fundamentals. We are agnostic about these interpretations;
the crucial point is that asset price shocks re￿ ect factors that function primarily
through asset prices. The purpose and intended contribution of this paper is to
improve our understanding of how this asset price channel functions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives sign restrictions for the
empirical identi￿cation of asset price shocks, and that section also outlines the model
speci￿cation, the data and the empirical implementation of the sign restrictions.
The benchmark results and various robustness tests are presented in section 3. A
discussion of the results and conclusions follow in section 4.
2 Methodology
2.1 Deriving the sign restrictions
In this section we discuss the set of sign restrictions to identify asset price shocks.
In particular, we utilize restrictions, discussed in detail in Fratzscher and Straub
(2008) - which is based on the empirical strategy discussed in Peersman and Straub
(2006) - who identify asset-price shocks uniquely and distinguish them from a set of
other shocks that are discussed as determinants of current account ￿ uctuations in
the literature. Table 1 summarizes the sign restrictions used for the identi￿cation
in our structural VAR. We associate positive asset price shocks (i.e. an exogenous
increase in asset prices) with a rise in consumption, in￿ ation, and interest rates. As
discussed in a ￿nite lifetime DSGE model in Fratzscher and Straub (2008), the rise in
current stock market wealth triggers an increase in private consumption. The latter
induces a surge in in￿ ation rates, and under the assumption of an active monetary
policy rule, an increase in interest rates.
As discussed above, the structural interpretation of such an asset price shock
may be understood as being a "news" shock, in which asset prices adjust because of
8
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fundamentals. In Beaudry and Portier (2006 and 2007), such a news shock can
be changes to expectations about future technology, thus inducing an adjustment
today. For instance, such a positive news shock due to an increase in expected
future productivity should lead to a rise in equity returns, as asset prices represent
the net discounted value of all future fundamentals. In turn, both in￿ ation and
private consumption tend to rise as supply declines as labour supply is reduced in
anticipation of such a positive future shock.
Note that this reaction of the di⁄erent macroeconomic variables is fundamentally
di⁄erent from the response following technology, government spending and monetary
policy shocks. First, technology shocks that trigger a rise in consumption are usually
associated with a fall in in￿ ation rates. Second, monetary policy shocks that induce
a positive response of consumption and in￿ ation are characterized by a fall in interest
rates. Third, in the model a fall in government spending, ￿nanced e.g. by lump-sum
taxes for simplicity, is associated by a rise in private consumption and in￿ ation, but
a fall in aggregate output. As a result, the reaction of policy interest rates depends
obviously on the monetary policy rule. As argued in Fratzscher and Straub (2008), a
standard Taylor rule implies a fall in interest rates, as the rise in in￿ ation is relatively
small, while the response of output is more pronounced for a wide range of structural
parameters. Note that, although we base our sign restriction identi￿cation strategy
on the predictions of a theoretical model, we do not have to restrict the response of
the current account and the real exchange rate, the main variables of interest. In
this respect, we can let the data to speak for itself.
Table 1: Theoretical Impulse Response Functions
consumption in￿ ation interest rate asset prices
Technology shock " #
Asset-price shock " " " "
Government spending shock " " #
Monetary policy shock " " #
A crucial issue is the structural interpretation of asset price shocks. The identi-
fying restrictions above separate an asset price shock from the standard macroeco-
nomic shocks usually analyzed (technology, monetary policy and government spend-
ing), without identifying the structural factors behind the asset price increase. Note
that other "demand side shocks" such as shocks to time preferences or distortionary
taxes might imply, under certain assumptions, similar patterns for the endogenous
variables as asset price shocks. On the other hand, exogenous changes in distor-
tionary taxes or time-preference rates are unlikely to be an important determinant
of business cycles at a quarterly level.
What is our interpretation of asset price shocks? As discussed above, one inter-
pretation of an asset price shock is that of a "news" shock (Beaudry and Portier
9
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likelihood of future outcomes, such as to economic fundamentals; or as in Engel and
Rogers (2006), where current account changes are consistent with changing expec-
tations of relative output shares. Note that in a ￿nite life-time model, as discussed
above, domestic consumption will adjust following a news shock about e.g. a change
in future productivity mainly through the wealth e⁄ects induced by ￿ uctuations in
asset prices, as asset prices correspond to the expected net discounted value of fu-
ture pro￿ts. An alternative interpretation is that asset price shocks re￿ ect rational
bubbles, as in Kraay and Ventura (2005) and Ventura (2001). We are agnostic about
these interpretations; the main point is that asset price shocks re￿ ect factors that
function primarily through asset prices. The objective of the empirical exercise is
to illustrate how this asset price channel functions.
2.2 Model speci￿cation and data
Consider the following speci￿cation for a vector of endogenous variables Yt:
Yt = a +
n X
i=1
AiYt￿i + B"t (1)
where a is a vector of constants, Ai is an (n￿n) matrix of autoregressive coe¢ cients
and "t is a vector of structural disturbances. Identi￿cation of (1) requires imposing
n(n-1)/2 restrictions on B, which we achieve by using the sign restrictions shown in
Table 1. Our sign restriction approach is based on Canova and De Nicol￿ (2002),
Uhlig (2005) and Peersman (2003), discussed in some detail in the next section.
Our VAR includes six variables: Yt = [EQ c i ￿ TB REER], a
relatively standard speci￿cation as, for instance, also used in Fratzscher, Juvenal and
Sarno (2007), i.e. private consumption (c), short-term interest rates (i), in￿ ation
(￿), equity returns (EQ), as well as the trade balance (TB) and the real e⁄ective
exchange rate (REER).
Our country sample focuses on the G7 industrialized countries. The time period
for the empirical analysis is 1974 to 2007, using quarterly data. We use 1974 as the
starting point of the analysis as it is the start of the ￿ oating exchange rate period
after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Of course, it would desirable to
extend the country sample, in particular to emerging market economies (EMEs) as
these are becoming increasingly important for the global economy and for global
￿nancial markets. In the robustness analysis, we extend our country sample by
including an additional 28 EMEs and other industrialized countries in the "rest
of the world". However, data availability limits the time period to 1990-2007 or
1995-2007. Table 3 in the appendix lists the countries included.
For our empirical estimation we use relative variables, i.e. we specify each vari-
able in domestic versus rest-of-the-world terms. More precisely, consumption c is
the di⁄erence in log private consumption in the domestic economy and log private
10
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period exchange rates). Interest rates i are the percentage di⁄erence of domestic
short-term (money market) rates from those in the rest of the world, while in￿ ation
￿ is the corresponding percentage di⁄erence in CPI in￿ ation. The rest of the world
for all three variables comprises the other 15 economies (in the benchmark sample)
or other 43 countries (in the extended sample), with each country being weighted
by its GDP share in the sample group.
We use relative variables for two reasons. First, for consistency reasons, as both
the trade balance and the exchange rate of a country are intrinsically "relative", i.e.
both of these variables express a relative ￿ ow or a relative price. Hence expressing
consumption, in￿ ation and interest rates as relative variables is consistent with this
empirical speci￿cation. The second reason for using relative variables is identi￿ca-
tion. As asset price movements tend to be highly positively correlated globally, an
increase in equity prices in the home country may re￿ ect an even stronger rise in
equity values abroad. In this case and under certain conditions, we would expect
the domestic trade balance to improve due to the wealth e⁄ects rather than deteri-
orate. Of course, one may include domestic and foreign asset returns, consumption,
in￿ ation and interest rates separately in the VAR speci￿cation; however, we did not
chose such a speci￿cation for computational reasons.1
Our preferred measure of asset prices EQ is the di⁄erence between domestic
equity returns and foreign equity returns, both measured in local currency terms.
We use local currencies to express returns, rather than US dollars, because we want
to obtain a measure of asset price shocks that excludes exchange rate movements.2
Moreover, we use shocks to equity prices, rather than changes to market capitaliza-
tion, as our preferred measures because our primary interest is in the cross-country
heterogeneity in the responses of the trade balance and the exchange rate. The
rest-of-the-world group comprises the other countries in the sample, with each of
these countries being weighted by their equity market capitalization. We use equity
market capitalization weights, rather than GDP weights, because asset shocks are
likely to a⁄ect the trade balance of countries partly through wealth e⁄ects, which
in turn should be related to the size of ￿nancial wealth held by households, which is
better proxied by market capitalization than GDP. In the section on the robustness
analysis below we will discuss how alternative speci￿cations of asset price shocks
in￿ uence the empirical ￿ndings.
The trade balance TB is measured as a ratio to domestic GDP. We use the trade
balance, rather than the current account, as we are interested in the e⁄ect of asset
price shocks on net exports and want to exclude the e⁄ect on income. We use the
total trade balance, rather than the trade balance only vis-a-vis the countries in the
1There is an emerging VAR literature using various aggregation methods for the rest of the
world - see the GVAR literature based on the work of Pesaran, Schuermann and Weiner (2004).
2Hau and Rey (2006) and Andersen et al. (2007), for instance, show that there tends to be
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including EMEs; a point to which we return in the robustness analysis. As the ￿nal
variable, the real e⁄ective exchange rate REER uses trade weights for a broad set
of partner countries, and is expressed in logs.
As to the data sources, the trade balance, consumption, in￿ ation and short-term
interest rates come from the IMF￿ s International Financial Statistics (IFS). Equity
returns and equity market capitalization are MSCI market indices and are sourced
from Bloomberg while we took the real e⁄ective exchange rates from the IFS and
the OECD. Table 4 in the appendix lists the variables, their de￿nitions and sources.
2.3 Implementation of the sign restrictions
Before moving on to the empirical results, it is useful to explain how we implement
the sign restrictions in our VAR. For a detailed explanation, we refer to Peersman
(2003). Consider equation (1). Since the shocks are mutually orthogonal, E ("t"
;
t) =
I, the variance-covariance matrix of equation (1) is equal to: ￿ = BB0. For any
possible orthogonal decomposition B, we can ￿nd an in￿nite number of admissible
decompositions of ￿, ￿ = BQQ0B0, where Q is any orthonormal matrix, i.e. QQ0 =
I. Possible candidates for B are the Choleski factor of ￿ or the eigenvalue-eigenvector
decomposition, ￿ = PDP0 = BB0, where P is a matrix of eigenvectors, D is a
diagonal matrix with eigenvalues on the main diagonal and B = PD
1
2. Following
Canova and De Nicol￿ (2002) and Peersman (2003), we start from the latter in our
analysis. More speci￿cally, P =
Q











1 ￿￿￿ 0 ￿￿￿ 0 ￿￿￿ 0
￿￿￿
... ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
0 ￿￿￿ cos(￿) ::: ￿sin(￿) ￿￿￿ 0
. . .
. . .




0 ￿￿￿ sin(￿) ￿￿￿ cos(￿) ￿￿￿ 0
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
... ￿￿￿










Since we have six variables in our model, there are n(n￿1)=2 = 15 bivariate rotations
of di⁄erent elements of the VAR: ￿ = ￿1;￿￿￿ ;￿15, and rows m and n are rotated
by the angle ￿i in equation (2). All possible rotations can be produced by varying
the 15 parameters ￿i in the range [0;￿]. For the contemporaneous impact matrix
determined by each point in the grid, Bj , we generate the corresponding impulse
responses:
Rj,t+k = A(L)￿1Bj"t (3)
A sign restriction on the impulse response of variable p at lag k to a shock in q at
time t is of the form:
R
pq
j,t+k ? 0 (4)
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ever, does not alter the ￿ndings in a meaningful way. Following Uhlig (2005) and
Peersman (2003), we use a Bayesian approach for estimation and inference. Our
prior and posterior belong to the Normal-Wishart family for drawing error bands.
Because there are an in￿nite number of admissible decompositions for each draw
from the posterior when using sign restrictions, we use the following procedure. To
draw the "candidate truths" from the posterior, we take a joint draw from the poste-
rior for the usual unrestricted Normal-Wishart posterior for the VAR parameters as
well as a uniform distribution for the rotation matrices, using 1000 draws. We then
construct impulse response functions. If all the imposed conditions of the impulse
responses are satis￿ed, we keep the draw, while other decompositions are rejected.
This means that these draws receive zero prior weight. Based on the draws kept, we
calculate statistics and report the median responses, together with 84th and 16th
percentile error bands.
3 Empirical results
This section presents the empirical results from the structural VAR with sign re-
strictions, applied to the G7 economies in the period 1974-2007. We also present
various extensions to check for the sensitivity and robustness of the ￿ndings.
3.1 Benchmark results
Figures 1-7 shows the impulse responses of the six variables, for each of the coun-
tries in our country sample of G7 countries, to a 10 percent positive asset market
shock based on our Bayesian VAR model. The shaded areas indicate the 16 and 84
percentiles of the posterior distribution, following the convention in the literature.
Table 2 summarizes the point estimates of the impulse responses at various time
horizons.
As to the United States (Figure 1), a 10 percent increase in (relative) US equity
prices leads to a substantial worsening in the US trade balance. The e⁄ect of the
asset price shock increases gradually over time up to 16-20 quarters, when it reduces
the US trade balances by 0.91 percentage points (p.p.) of US GDP. This e⁄ect of
asset prices on the trade balance appears to stem from two channels, a ￿rst one
through wealth e⁄ects and a second related to the exchange rate. The importance
of wealth e⁄ects is evident by the strong and quite persistent increase in private
consumption, which in turn leads to a higher demand for imports.
The role of the exchange rate channel is underlined by the signi￿cant appreciation
of the REER after a positive asset price shock. The real appreciation is likely to
be in￿ uenced both by the increase in domestic in￿ ation and in domestic interest
rates, though both of these responses are more short-lived as in￿ ation and nominal
interest rates revert back within 10 quarters. The rise in interest rates and real
13
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of a signi￿cant forward discount bias found in the literature (e.g. Engel, 1996), as
well as the more recent evidence stressing the importance of monetary policy or
￿ Taylor-rule￿fundamentals for exchange rate determination (Engel and West, 2005,
Mark, 2005, Clarida and Waldman, 2007).3
Figures 2-7 shows the corresponding impulse responses for the other G7 countries
of the sample. With a few exceptions, the patterns of the impulse responses are quite
similar across countries: the trade balance of most countries deteriorates in response
to a positive asset price shock, though the permanence of this response is mostly
somewhat lower than that of the United States. Moreover, the real exchange rate
and private consumption always increases over the medium-run after an increase
in equity prices, though again the permanence of this e⁄ect di⁄ers markedly across
countries. The strength of the reaction of private consumption for most countries
suggests that wealth e⁄ects constitute an important channel through which asset
price shocks a⁄ect the trade balance of countries.
3Moreover, this positive e⁄ect of asset prices on the exchange rate is not necessarily inconsistent
with the literature that ￿nds a negative correlation between equity returns and exchange rate
movements (Hau and Rey, 2006, Andersen et al., 2007) as those correlations are unconditional ones
and may stem from other types of shocks.
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USA UK Germany France Italy Canada Japan
1 quarter
trade balance -0.36 1.28 -0.09 -0.17 -0.70 -0.17 0.28
REER 3.12 2.72 -0.66 0.62 0.95 1.62 3.43
consumption 4.88 4.37 0.80 4.34 4.57 3.57 4.06
in￿ ation 0.75 2.48 0.71 0.81 1.01 1.23 1.69
interest rates 1.88 4.81 0.87 1.41 1.41 2.25 1.83
equity markets 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
8 quarters
trade balance -0.66 0.28 -1.02 -0.58 -0.43 -0.04 0.21
REER 5.11 6.11 3.10 0.47 2.70 6.79 11.26
consumption 7.09 5.19 9.31 0.75 2.94 9.59 13.13
in￿ ation 0.43 -1.25 0.24 0.29 0.67 0.06 0.38
interest rates 0.69 -0.15 0.83 0.59 1.40 0.10 0.03
equity markets 6.37 -0.70 0.70 -2.04 5.78 12.04 11.38
16 quarters
trade balance -0.91 -0.16 -0.87 -0.06 0.32 -0.61 -0.25
REER 4.64 1.99 1.47 -0.16 1.38 4.83 5.39
consumption 7.29 -0.10 5.38 -0.31 1.01 6.74 7.99
in￿ ation -0.03 -0.40 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.30
interest rates 0.38 0.16 0.16 0.28 1.02 0.18 0.08
equity markets 0.79 2.38 2.00 -0.16 1.63 10.86 -0.80
Notes: The table shows the responses of the various variables 1 quarter, 8 quarters
and 16 quarters after a positive 10% shock to relative equity prices, i.e. a 10 percent rise
of domestic asset prices relative to those in the rest of the world.
Nominal interest rates and in￿ ation also rise in the short-run, though recall that
we imposed this response for the ￿rst four quarters in order to identify asset price
shocks. However, the magnitude and the persistence of the reaction of interest rates
and in￿ ation again di⁄er substantially across countries. We also note and show the
impulse responses for countries with somewhat puzzling results. For instance, the
trade balance for the UK (Figure 2) improves in response to a positive domestic
asset price shock.
Table 2 illustrates the heterogeneity of the point estimates at di⁄erent time hori-
zons, after 1 quarter, 8 quarters and 16 quarters, respectively. The table shows the
marked di⁄erences in the impulse responses across countries, with in the magnitude
as well as in the dynamics and timing of the transmission of asset price shocks.
For instance, Italy￿ s trade balance appears to react relatively quickly to asset price
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trast, the opposite is the case for the UK, where the reduction in the trade balance
materializes only after several quarters.
Table 2 also nicely illustrates the di⁄erent channels that are at play in transmit-
ting the asset price shock to the trade balance of countries. Countries that experience
a stronger reaction of their trade balance to the asset price shock also exhibit a larger
response of their real e⁄ective exchange rate as well as private consumption. For
instance, for the reaction after 16 quarters, it is in particular the United States but
also Germany and Canada that see the strongest response of their trade balance,
yet also experience a relatively larger sensitivity of private consumption and of their
REER to the asset price shock. Hence, this suggests that both a wealth e⁄ect on
private consumption as well as a exchange rate channel are at play in explaining the
transmission of an asset price shock to a country￿ s trade balance.
Finally, the current ￿nancial market turmoil has further increased the focus on
the role of monetary policy in addressing asset prices, and in particular asset price
bubbles. What do the impulse responses tell us about the potential role of monetary
policy as a channel through which asset price shocks may be transmitted to the trade
balance of countries? In principle, one would expect that an aggressive tightening of
monetary policy in response to a positive asset price shock should dampen the e⁄ect
of this shock on consumption and thus on net exports through the wealth channel.
However, on the other hand, such a tightening may lead to an appreciation of the
exchange rate and a worsening of the trade balance. Based on the impulse responses
in Figures 1-7, and the summary of these impulse responses shown in Table 2, there
seems to be no clear-cut relationship between the response of interest rates, private
consumption, in￿ ation and the trade balance across countries. This of course is no
more than suggestive, and does not necessarily imply that monetary policy is not
relevant for in￿ uencing the impact of asset prices on the trade balance. However,
for instance for the United States these ￿ndings suggest that the reaction of US
short-term interest rates to asset price shocks is not systematically lower than that
of other industrialized countries.
3.2 Robustness and extensions
How robust are these ￿ndings across alternative speci￿cations, country samples and
time periods? We conduct several robustness tests on the benchmark model.4
One important issue is how dependent our empirical ￿ndings are on the iden-
ti￿cation, i.e. the sign restrictions we impose. While these sign restrictions seems
sensible, it is nevertheless useful to see how the results change when using alter-
native identi￿cation methods. We do so by estimating our six-variable VAR using
a Choleski decomposition. More precisely, we estimate the VAR using each pos-
4We show here only the corresponding results for the United States, though the conclusions on
the robustness checks are qualitatively similar for other countries.
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the resulting impulse response functions. Figure 8 shows the impulse responses of
the trade balance to a positive asset price shock for the case of the United States,
the UK, Germany and France. The top of the shaded area represents to maximum
response coe¢ cient among the di⁄erent Choleski decompositions, while the lower
end shows the minimum response at any time horizon. Overall, the ￿ndings suggest
that the direction of the trade balance response to an asset price shock is mostly
the same when taking the Choleski decomposition as when using sign restrictions.
However, the range of possible impulse responses is in several cases very large, un-
derlining that the shape of the impulse responses is strongly dependent on the zero
restrictions imposed on the variance-covariance matrix.
As a next step, we use alternative variables and variable de￿nitions to check
how sensitive the ￿ndings are to such changes. First, we use the current account
instead of the trade balance, taking into account the fact that the dynamics of
both can be considerably di⁄erent for some countries. Figure 9 shows the impulse
responses of this speci￿cation for the United States and con￿rms the basic thrust of
the benchmark results as the current account declines considerably after a positive
asset price shock. In fact, the reaction of the current account is somewhat stronger,
as one would indeed expect, likely due to the decline not only of the trade balance
but also of the income part of the current account.
Second, we use relative equity market capitalization,5 rather than equity prices,
to de￿ne asset price shocks. Figure 10 shows that the pattern of the impulse re-
sponses is unchanged for the United States (as well as for other industrialized coun-
tries, which are not shown for brevity reasons).
As a third robustness check, we shorten the time sample to 1990-2007 in order
to allow for the possibility that asset price shocks may have become more important
over time as countries have become more integrated ￿nancially and through trade.
Figure 11 shows that the initial reaction of the trade balance is slightly larger and the
response of private consumption signi￿cantly larger for the United States, lending
some support to this conjecture.
In summary, asset price shocks appear to have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the trade
balance of countries, partly through wealth e⁄ects on domestic consumption and
partly through an exchange rate channel that leads a real appreciation of the do-
mestic currency. Moreover, there are substantial cross-country di⁄erences in the
e⁄ect of asset price shocks, with the trade balance of the United States in particular
exhibiting one of the largest reactions to asset price shocks.
5Relative equity market capitalization is measured as the di⁄erence in the log domestic market
capitalization and the log rest-of-the-world market capitalization, both measured in US dollars.
Using market exchange rates or PPP exchange rates does not change the ￿ndings in a meaningful
way. More recisely, While the magnitude of the impulse responses may change depending on the
speci￿cation, the direction and dynamics is very similar across speci￿cations.
17
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1014
February 20094 Conclusions
The paper has analysed the e⁄ect of asset price shocks on the current account. Its
focus has been on the experience of the cross-section of G7 industrialized countries.
We have employed a Bayesian VAR with sign restrictions in order not only to mo-
tivate the identifying restrictions for asset price shocks, but also to ensure that we
can distinguish this type of shock from other shocks, such as to productivity, mon-
etary policy and government spending. The empirical evidence suggests that asset
price shocks indeed exert a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the trade balance of countries, partly
through a wealth channel of private consumption and partly via an exchange rate
channel.
One of the central ￿ndings of the paper is the substantial cross-country hetero-
geneity that we detect in the sensitivity of the trade balance to asset price shocks.
In particular the US trade balance seems to be among the most sensitive to relative
asset price shocks, falling by 0.91 percentage points in response to a 10 percent
increase in US equity prices relative to the rest of the world. By contrast, other
countries￿trade balances appear to be less responsive to asset price shocks.
Many open questions remain and there are various future avenues for better
understanding the importance of asset price shocks, both domestically and globally.
In particular against the background of the ￿nancial market turmoil of 2007-08, the
role of monetary policy for asset prices remains unclear. Similarly, the focus of the
present paper has been only on equity markets. Extending the analysis to housing
markets seems particularly relevant in the current ￿nancial market context. Another
important avenue is to extend the analysis to emerging markets, which are rapidly
becoming ever more important players in the global economy and international
￿nancial markets. We leave these avenues for future research.
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Figure 1: United States- Impulse Response following an Asset Price Shock
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Figure 3: Germany- Impulse Response following an Asset Price Shock
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Figure 4: France- Impulse Response following an Asset Price Shock
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Figure 5: Italy- Impulse Response following an Asset Price Shock
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Figure 6: Canada- Impulse Response following an Asset Price Shock
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Figure 7: Japan- Impulse Response following an Asset Price Shock
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Figure 8: Impulse Response following Choleski Decomposition
30
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1014











































Working Paper Series No 1014








































Figure 10: United States- Impulse Response following an Asset Price Shock
with Equity Market Capitalization
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Figure 11: United States- Impulse Response following an Asset Price Shock
with time sample 1990-2007
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